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RECENT CASES
there is much variance' and the better rule appears to be stated in
Moraitis v. Delany,' which holds that the circumstances of the cases
may vary the length of the detention. It is, however, agreed and constantly emphasized that deportation is not a criminal process? and
the right to confine an alien is merely incidental to the right to exclude and expel.' Abuse of this right is imprisonment contrary to
the Thirteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution," although
the alien may be held during the deportation proceedings and for a
reasonable period thereafter." At least one case, Petition of Brooks,"
sustains the proposition that such conditional release as is found in
the instant case is unjustified and the alien must be deported or released. Should the court choose to follow United States ex rel. Doukas
v. Wiley," petitioner might, on the other hand, be subject to deportation as long as 24 years after the issuance of the original order of
deportation. It appears that laches does not deprive the order of its
effectiveness, ' although in Petition of Popper the court said a deportation order was Junctus officio where the government failed to
exercise its right of deportation. In that case it was held that such
an order was not a bar to naturalization.
The deposition of the Staniszewski case, however, appears not to
be a conclusive adjudication of the rights of petitioner since the government by its own admission cannot dispose of him as the deportation order directs. It would seem that the court has temporarily
sidestepped the issue. If, as in Petition of Popper," where the fact
situation has aspects similar to the instant case, the government is
ever to remain silent on the order, then the rule in Petition of
Brooks"s would serve the same purpose more efficiently and judiciously.
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city to carry liability insurance indemnifying the public against injuries. Plaintiff, a paying taxi-passenger injured in a collision, brought
suit for damages, joining inter alia as parties defendant the taxicab
owner and his liability insurer. The insurer demurred for (1) misjoinder of parties defendant, arguing that there exists in North Dakota a public policy against mentioning insurance in a jury trial;
and for (2) misjoinder of causes of action, contending that the cause
of action in tort for the negligent acts of the taxicab operator could
not be joined with the cause of action in contract upon the insurance
policy. Held, there was a proper joinder of both parties and causes
of action under the particular circumstances involved. James v.
Young, 43 N. W. 2d 692 (N. D. 1950).
This decision is far from a blanket authority to join as defendants
any insured and his liability insurer. Only two states, by express
terms of statute, permit such a liberal joinder procedure.! North
Dakota, on the other hand, specifically prohibits joinder of the insurer of a common motor carrier,' and impliedly prohibits joinder of
the insurer of an ordinary motor vehicle owner or operator.' In a
situation not covered by these express prohibitions, the right to joinder depends upon an interpretation of general pleading statutes, or
in the absence of statute, upon the common law.' The instant decision
is based upon the general pleading statutes in the North Dakota Revised Code.
The North Dakota statute on joinder of parties defendant declares
in sweeping terms that "Any person who has or claims an interest in
the controversy adverse to the plaintiff...may be made a defendant."' This would seem to make any insurer, whose pecuniary interests are certainly adverse to the plaintiff, a proper party defendant; but even so, there is no right to sue the insurer either jointly
or separately unless there exists also a cause of action against him.' In
the ordinary voluntary insurance situation there is no cause of action
in contract, since there is no privity of contract between the injured
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party and the insurer;' nor is there a cause of action in tort, since
the insurer had nothing to do with the negligent acts causing the
injuries. In short, in the voluntary insurance situation, the injured
party has no cause of action against the insurer, but only against the
insured who caused his injuries, and so there is no right to join the
insurer as a party defendant.'
But the instant case involved compulsory insurance under a city
ordinance designed expressly to "...indemnify those using such taxicab line and the public in general against loss to person and property.""1 Since statutory provisions are written into every poli-

cy,' the effect of this ordinance was to make the injured plaintiff a
third-party beneficiary of the insurance contract;" as such he had a
right of action in contract against the insurer,;' in addition to his
right of action in tort against the taxi operator. The instant case holds
that these two causes of action arose out of the same transaction, and
are therefore joinable under North Dakota's liberal code provision on

joinder of causes of action," designed to avoid multiplicity of suits.'
In so holding, the court is in accord with other jurisdictions having
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insured takes out insurance, not to benefit a third person he may injure, but to protect his own pocketbook from suits by that third person.
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126 Fla. 219, 170 So. 707 (1936), aff'd sub nom. State ex rel. Davidson v. Parks,
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The court in the instant case also referred to N. D. Rev. Code (1943) §-22-0206,
which states that "One who indemnifies another person against an act to be done
by the latter is liable jointly with the person indemnified and separately to every
person injured by such act." It is submitted that this is a liability statute found
in the code chapter on "Indemnity", and has nothing to do with the procedural
question of joinder of parties and causes. Northam v. Casualty Co. of America, 177
F. 981 (D. C. Mont. 1909), semble.
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The insurer probably could have avoided the result of the instant
decision by inserting in its policy a "no action" clauseF The courts
generally hold that such a clause forbids joinder of the insurer in a
suit against the insured;' and only a specific statute enabling joinder
of the insurer will override such a clause within a policy."
The case appears to be one of first impression in North Dakota,
although three other cases have been found which consider the related
question of the propriety of informing jurors that the defendant has insurance, when no insurer is a party to the record. A careful study
of these cases' indicates that the North Dakota Supreme Court recognizes the prejudicial effect of such information where it is injected
for no purpose other than to encourage a larger verdict against the
defendant; but these cases in no way deny the right to join an insurance company as defendant where a direct cause of action exists
against that company under a reasonable construction of our plead-

ing statutes.
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